Giorgio Dini

Collective action problems emerge when individual incentives and group interests are misaligned, as in the case of climate change. Individuals involved in these problems are generally considered to have two options: contribute toward public solutions such as global warming mitigation or free ride. However, many collective action problems today involve a third option of investing in a “private solution” such as local adaptation. The availability of this third option can lead to a private solution trap whereby private solutions are adopted, collectively optimal public solutions are not provided, and existing inequalities are exacerbated. We investigated the private solution trap with a collective action game featuring private and public solutions, wealth inequality determined by luck or merit, and participants from 34 countries. We found that the joint existence of private solutions and wealth inequality had a consistent effect across countries: Participants given a higher endowment adopted private solutions almost twice as often as those given a lower endowment, regardless of whether it was determined by luck or merit, and contributed proportionally less toward public solutions. Wealth inequality increased in every country and those given lower endowments were often left unprotected as public solutions were not provided. Across countries, cultural values of hierarchy and harmony were associated with preferences for private and public solutions, respectively. We also identified two universal pathways toward public solution provision: early contributions and conditional cooperation. Our findings highlight the ubiquity of the private solution trap, its cultural underpinnings, and its potential consequences for global collective action problems.

Food choices and in particular meat consumption have major impacts on the local and global environment, which is why the topic is gaining attention in environmental economics and other disciplines. In this study, we investigate the effect of increased visibility on food choices, for which there has been little research to date. We present findings from a field experiment among researchers at a large environmental economics conference. When registering for the three-days conference and prior to choosing between vegan, vegetarian, or meat/fish lunches, half of the participants were informed that their choice would be visibly printed on their conference name badge. The remaining half were informed of this saliency only after their food choice (at the conference venue). Despite the conference setting in which environmentally friendly choices and signals are likely to be valued, we find no significant effect of the treatment on lunch choices. We discuss possible reasons for the null effect, including that the consequences of visibility are ignored, discounted, or already factored in.

While the industry is witnessing a progressive ecological transition, it is still unclear how greener sectors can expand in the market without an adequate labour supply. We carry out an experiment (n = 500) to investigate what incentives are most effective in encouraging people to apply for green jobs. To do so, we elicit ranked preferences towards green and brown jobs with different intertemporal payoffs. In the treatment group, subjects experience a mild level of social pressure in favour of a green transition. Findings from a probabilistic model show that, when treated, subjects are 24.4 percentage points more likely to favour green job opportunities, especially those granting increasing wage profiles. Differences in treatment are particularly evident for women, individuals with large circles of friends, introverts, and questioners of the green economy. As the job market transitions toward greener opportunities, our work contributes to understanding how peer pressure strategies can encourage applications for green jobs.